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Abstract 
 
During the recent years of economic boom in Spain, 
political corruption at the local level boomed as well. In 
fact, it increased from 7 publicly denounced cases from 
1999-2003 to at least 180 in the last legislative period 
(2007-2011). In this paper, we explore this phenomenon 
in two related ways: how it has affected voting results 
and political participation, and whether the wrongdoing 
of local politicians has undermined the voters’ 
confidence in them. We constructed a socioeconomic 
municipality database that matched polling results and 
corruption cases and then estimated a voting-share 
equation by difference-in-difference and matching 
techniques. Our results confirm that the voters’ attitude 
towards corruption is significantly different with respect 
to parties on the right or the left. In fact, after an 
imputation in a local corruption case, abstention 
increases by an average 1.8 percentage points, left-
parties’ voting share is reduced by approximately 2 
percentage points, while right-parties’ share increases 
approximately 3 points. However, if the imputed 
candidate stands for re-election again, right-parties 
voting share is reduced by 4.4 points, but right-wing 
corruption at superior levels also increases voting share. 
JEL classification: D02; D73; P16. 
Keywords: Voters’ attitude; Political parties. 
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1. Introduction
Although no country in the world is free of corruption,1 Spain is unique in this regard. During the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, the economic boom in Spain also increased political 
corruption, primarily at the local level. This is in contrast to the rest of the world, where it is 
expected that further development yields decreased corruption. In fact, corruption is becoming a 
popular position in this country (see, for example, the 15-M Movement against Spanish politicians 
and corruption), and no social strata are clean.2
But what is corruption? A simple definition of this term is “the misuse of entrusted power for 
private benefit”3, while the dictionary refers to moral decay and express, incontrovertible 
condemnation (Pellegrini, 2011).4 Bribery, a clear example of corruption, involves the use of 
incentives to elicit a change in one’s course of action. Here, we can distinguish between political 
and bureaucratic corruption: In the former, a policy maker influences legislation in exchange for a 
side payment. The latter occurs when a public official fails to implement policy as it was intended.
The existing academic literature has primarily focused on the effects of corruption on economic 
growth, development, trade, and so forth. The majority of these articles use macro-indicators at 
the country level and discuss regional characteristics that influence economics in addition to 
corruption (see section 2).
Although the topic of corruption in established democracies has been under-researched, studies 
of local corruption have recently emerged in the literature. Two related papers by Fernández-
Vázquez and Rivero (2010) and Costas-Pérez et al (forthcoming) analyse Spanish corruption at 
the local level, though the former focuses on one particular Spanish region, while the latter studies 
general effects of corruption and press dissemination on voters.
1 Despite being one of the least corrupt democracies of the world, Sweden is also affected by local 
corruption (see Erlingsson et al, 2008).
2 The Monarchy was affected by a case of corruption; the King’s son-in-law (Inaki Urdangarín, former 
international handball player) was involved in a money laundering scandal through his nonprofit foundation.
3 See Transparency International.
4 This author presents a more formal definition of this term as follows: “Corruption is the misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain; it is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a given role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violate rules against 
the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a 
reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public 
resources for private-regarding uses)”. See Pellegrini (2011), Chapter 2, page 17. This definition improves 
ones by Nye (1967).
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                                                           Document de Treball   2012/12 pàg. 5
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                                           Working Paper          2012/12 pag. 5
5
In this paper, we construct a Spanish municipality database that includes economic indicators, 
polling results and data on corruption cases, to test whether such cases affected voting in the 
period 1999-2011,5 we estimate a voting-share equation by difference-in-difference and apply a 
matching estimator.
The relevance of this work is as follows: First, we examine voters’ differing perceptions of 
corruption based on which party is corrupted (i.e., right-wing or left-wing) and evaluate the effects 
of these perceptions on abstention, often considered as an indicator of general disagreement. 
Second, our database includes not only local corruption cases but also provincial and regional 
cases. Third, we include data on three regional polls and are thus able to test the cumulative 
effects of voters´ perceptions across time. Finally, we control for multiple accusations of 
corruption.
Next, section 2 includes a brief discussion of the literature on this topic. The detailed database 
and characteristics of Spanish local corruption are shown in section 3. A description of the effects 
of local corruption on voters is included in section 4, separated into effects on abstention (4.1) and 
right- or left-wing corruption (4.2). Our conclusions are presented in section 5.
2. Literature review
International and cross-sectional studies comprise the majority of the empirical literature on the 
sources of corruption (see Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008 for a survey). Accordingly, most use 
international indicators, such as those made by World Bank (Kaufmann et al, 1999 and 2003),6 to 
test which factors affect the existence and persistence of corruption around the world.
For example, Manzetti and Wilson (2007) use macro data to make an empirical analysis of 14 
countries around the world to explore the question of why corrupt governments maintain public 
support. The authors conclude that a negative relationship exists between strong democratic 
institutions and tolerance of corrupt governments. This is due to citizens perceiving the higher 
opportunity costs of clientelism associated with corrupt leadership.
5 As we explain in section 2, the referenced papers use data from a foundation linked to the most important 
left-wing party in Spain.
6 Kaufmann (1997) provides a summary of ideas about corruption.
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At the national level, the literature includes more detailed analyses about the effects of corruption 
on electoral outcomes. Most of them are aligned with political and sociological issues, and no 
statistical approach was used.7
In the United States, Peters and Welch (1978) conclude that 75% of politicians who had been 
involved in a scandal (including those related to private life) were re-elected. After investigating 
the Clinton-Lewinsky case, Miller (1999) concludes that personal scandals have little influence on
the vote.
Reed (1999) also concludes that 65% of corrupt politicians in Japan were re-elected and that the 
severity of "punishment" lessens with the passage of time. Lafay and Servais (2000) claim that 
the re-election of corrupt mayors is unlikely and that, in cases in which they were re-elected, the 
difference in votes was low or the opponent was very weak. Using data from Mexico, McCann and 
Domínguez (1998) argue that corruption is irrelevant to the probability of voting for the opposing
party.
However, fewer papers focus on local corruption. Brazil´s federal government audited a number of 
municipalities at random in 2003 to detect local cases of corruption. These audits were publicised 
before the 2004 elections so that voters knew whether the incumbents had been involved in 
corruption. In estimating voters’ reactions to these audits, Ferraz and Finan (2008) found that 
corrupt incumbents’ vote shares reduced in a range of 10 to 30 percent, depending, in part, upon 
the dissemination of the audits in local media.8
As we will show in the next section, several corruption scandals (not only at the local level) have 
occurred in Spain. In 1996, the most important left-wing party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español,
or PSOE) lost the national vote due partially to corruption cases. In fact, national sociological data 
showed that corruption was ranked among the top 3 national problems in those years (see 
Caínzos and Jiménez, 2000).
Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero (2010) estimate the effect of corruption cases on local election 
results in a Spanish Region (Andalucía) in the period 2003-2007. Using data from 740 
municipalities in this region, they attempt to determine the effect of accused incumbents on local 
voters’ decisions. Their results support the idea that a party accused of corruption may, in fact, 
7 Caínzos and Jiménez (2004) include an interesting discussion of this question.
8 A survey experiment was conducted by Winters and Weltz-Shapiro (2010) in Brazil. They found that 
voters tend to reject corrupt politicians when information about the corruption is delivered in a credible and 
accessible manner.
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fare better than an honest one provided that the incumbent mayor is removed from office and a 
new candidate is chosen. As the authors state, “corruption is, unquestionably, an undesired value 
for voters unless they extract a direct benefit from it”.
In a paper very much related to this topic, Costas-Pérez et al (forthcoming) use data on local 
corruption in Spain to estimate the effect on electoral outcomes. Their data were provided by 
Fundación Alternativas, a Spanish think-tank that has close links with PSOE (the most important 
left-wing party in Spain). After ensuring that data contain no political bias due to their source, 
authors focus on the number of news reported on political scandals that have not necessarily 
been formally accused.
They estimate a voters’ equation such that the dependent variable is the incumbent’s vote share 
over the total number of votes or, in the case of coalitions, the sum of the total votes of the 
parties. Using data from two local elections in the period 1999-2007, their OLS and difference-in-
difference analyses demonstrate that the average vote loss after a corruption scandal was 
approximately 4%, though this percentage increased to 14% if newspapers covered the scandal.
3. Political corruption in Spain and the database
After the period of transition to democracy in Spain, the importance of the two main parties -
namely, Partido Popular (hereafter, PP) corresponding to the main right-wing party, and the party 
known as Partido Socialista Obrero Español (hereafter, PSOE) on behalf of the main left-wing 
party - has varied significantly over time.
If we analyse the voting results in national elections over time, we can observe a quite different 
pattern. In the elections of 1982, the two parties together attained 72.9% of the votes, not only 
due to the increased importance of PP but also because of the higher number of votes obtained 
by the main left-wing party (PSOE). After a slight decrease of 4 percentage points in 1986, the 
tendency has been the growth of the two-party system from a general perspective, reaching the 
highest point in the elections of 2008, with 83.3% of votes when including the vote-shares. Similar 
to local elections, in 2011, there was a decrease in vote-shares, reaching 72.4% of PP and 
PSOE.9
9 Recent local elections took place in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. National elections took place in 1996, 
2000, 2004, 2008 and 2011.
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The two-party system at the local level, considered to be the total of the vote share achieved by 
PP and PSOE, has increased between 1987 (36.6% and 20.1% of the votes, respectively, 50.7% 
of the total votes) and 2007, when the combined total of the two parties added up to 70.5% of the 
votes. However, this amount fell in the latest round of local elections that took place in 2011. The
share of the two-party system declined, obtaining a total of 64.2% of the votes, returning to 
approximately the level reached by both parties in the 1991 elections. This is a process called 
nationalisation of the electoral results at the local level; although it is possible for local parties to 
run in the election, national parties obtain an increased share of the votes (Fernández-Vázquez 
and Rivero, 2010).
As we have discussed in section 1, our main purpose is to determine whether and to what extent 
local corruption is punished at the polls. We distinguish between the treatment received by the 
main right-wing and the main left-wing party at local elections. Because we have at our disposal a 
panel of data on different Spanish municipalities from 1999 to 2011, we intend to measure the 
sensitivity or, on the contrary, the insensitivity of voters to corruption cases from year to year.
As mentioned above, the database consists of a balanced panel of data from more than 3,200 
Spanish municipalities from 1999 to 2011. We collect various socio-economic indicators, such as 
population, unemployment rate, number of bank offices, and so forth, at a local level. In terms of 
elections, we have registered the exact number of votes obtained by different parties standing for 
the local elections in each municipality. Likewise, we have considered the number of abstentions, 
the blank ballot-papers and the spoiled ballot-papers as well as the census of the municipality, the 
number of valid votes and the figure of voters.
The great importance of the data is constituted by the corruption variables. We first identified all 
municipalities in our sample that have experienced at least an allegation of corruption, using a 
binary variable. Next, we examined local corruption case by case, recording the implicated 
political party and the year the alleged corruption began in order to isolate cases of corruption that 
took place before elections and noting whether the candidate stood for the election after being 
implicated.
We must now clarify that we have compiled this database using various news sources published 
electronically and that the information has been checked by consulting two or more reliable 
sources. Following this principle, we define an alleged offence as a case of corruption only when 
the accused has already been imputed or impeached by a judge. However, we must distinguish 
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between accusation and guilt, the first lacking conclusive proof. Politicians are considered 
imputed but not guilty if their corruption cases were resolved during the period considered in our 
database.
Apart from corruption at the local level, we have also introduced the provincial and regional cases 
in which the different political parties have been involved. That is, we have considered the two 
immediate federal levels that may affect the results of elections in the municipalities. As in the 
local cases, we have recorded the party involved and the year the corruption ended.
Table 1 shows the number of corruption cases by level of government and political party. We can 
see how the two main political parties analysed in this paper take part in most of the corruption 
cases at the local level (higher than 80 percent). Nevertheless, the quantity of cases in which PP 
and PSOE are involved is quite similar. In total, we have identified 234 cases of alleged local 
corruption - 18 cases at the provincial level and 8 cases in the Spanish Autonomous 
Communities. Another noteworthy fact is that the number of cases of corruption offences has 
increased over time.
Table 1. Number of corruption cases by level of government and political party
Local Provincial Regional
PP PSOE Others PP PSOE Others PP PSOE Others
1999-2003 2 (28.6) 2 (28.6) 3 (42.8) 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004-2007 21 (44.7) 16 (34) 10(21.3) 1 (20) 4 (40) 0 2 (100) 0 0
2008-2011 79 (43.9) 70 (38.9) 31(17.2) 2 (15.4) 8 (61.5) 3 (23.1) 1 (16.7) 4 (66.6) 1 (16.7)
Total 102 (43.6) 88 (37.6) 44(18.8) 3 (16.6)
12
(66.8) 3 (16.6) 3 (37.5) 4 (50) 1 (12.5)
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: Corruption share in period among brackets.
If we analyse the corruption cases mentioned above by geographical location, it is clear that the 
majority of them are in the municipalities of the south of Spain. This difference, with respect to the 
other regions, is even greater in the period 2007-2011. However, the provincial and regional 
cases are distributed differently, with higher numbers in the north and the east, respectively. Table 
2 shows the total number of cases and the percentage that corresponds to each zone and period.
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Table 2. Number of corruption cases by Geographical situation10
Location 1999-2003
2003-
2007
2007-
2011 Total
Local
North 1 (14.3) 6 (12.8) 31 (17.2) 38 (16.2)
South 5 (71.4) 22 (46.8) 61 (33.9) 88 (37.6)
East 0 11 (23.4) 48 (26.7) 59 (25.3)
Center 1 (14.3) 8 (17) 40 (22.2) 49 (20.9)
Provincial
North 0 0 6 (46.1) 6 (33.3)
South 0 3 (60) 2 (15.4) 5 (27.8)
East 0 1 (20) 5 (38.5) 6 (33.3)
Center 0 1 (20) 0 1 (5.6)
Regional
North 0 0 1 (16.67) 1 (12.5)
South 0 1 (50) 1 (16.67) 2 (25)
East 0 1 (50) 3 (50) 4 (50)
Center 0 0 1 (16.67) 1 (12.5)
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: Corruption share in period among brackets.
Additionally, our database allows us to classify the corruption cases by type. It is a gross division 
because multiple charges may be brought against a single politician, so one case might fit into 
different categories. However, as we studied each case in detail, we categorised them based on 
the most significant allegation of corruption.
In Table 3, we see that the right-wing party is involved in more cases of urban planning corruption, 
while the left-wing party has the same amount in embezzlement of funds. We must clarify that the 
difference in the total number of corruption cases between Tables 1 and 3 is due to the manner of 
counting the cases: in Table 3, we have not taken the involvement of a second party into account 
because our purpose is to broadly show the types of corruption.
10 North includes Galicia, Asturias, País Vasco, Cantabria, La Rioja, Navarra and Castilla y León. South 
groups Andalucía, Canarias and autonomus municipalities of Ceuta and Melilla. East refers to Baleares, 
Murcia, Valencia, Aragón and Cataluña. Center includes Madrid, Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha.
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Table 3. Number of corruption cases by type of corruption and political party11
PP PSOE Others
Urban Planning 
Corruption 36 (48.6) 24 (32.5)
14
(18.9)
Embezzlement of funds 20 (33.9) 24 (40.7) 15(25.4)
Others 38 (46.9) 31 (38.3) 12(18.4)
Total 94 (43.9) 79 (36.9) 41(19.2)
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: Corruption share in period among brackets.
The variables used to estimate the equations in section 4 are as follows:
(i) Corruptedi: binary variable that takes the value 1 if there has been a case of corruption in the 
municipality i at any moment among the period 1999-2011. Source: Own elaboration (see
previous paragraphs).
(ii) Population(lagged)it: the population of the municipality i at year t but lagged one year to show 
the year before elections. Source: La Caixa municipal database.
(iii) Unemployment(lagged)it: the unemployment rate in municipality i at year t. Lagged one year. 
Source: La Caixa municipal database.
(iv) HHIit: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, measuring the concentration of vote share between 
political parties in the municipality i at year t. This variable allows us to measure the influence of 
the intensity of “competition” on the votes at each municipality. It is elaborated using polling data 
from Ministerio del Interior.
(v) Share-PPit: represents the share of votes of the main right-wing party (PP) in the municipality i
at year t. We also use the share data lagged variable for previous local elections (four years 
before). This lagged variable allows us to control for historical voting behaviour in each 
municipality. It is elaborated using polling data from Ministerio del Interior.
(vi) Share-PSOEit: this variable represents the share of votes of the main left-wing party (PSOE) in 
the municipality i at year t. We also use the share data lagged variable for previous local elections 
11 Urban Planning Corruption includes cases of corruption related to the urban planning, the environment 
and similar irregularities. Embezzzlement of funds refers to frauds, misuse of public funds, laundering and 
influence peddling, Others include the rest of the cases.
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(four years before). We include it for the reason mentioned above. It is elaborated using polling 
data from Ministerio del Interior.
(vii) %Abstentionblanksandnullsit: the total of the percentage of abstentions, blank votes and null 
votes in municipality i at year t. We also use the lagged variable (previous local polling). Source: 
Ministerio del Interior.
(viii) Corruptionbefore2003i: a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the case of local corruption 
at municipality i was brought before 2003 and 0 in all other cases.
(ix) Corruptionperiod2003-07i: takes the value 1 if the case of local corruption at municipality i was 
brought between 2003 and 2007 and 0 if brought in the years prior to 2003.
(x) Corruptionperiod2007-11i: takes the value 1 if the case of local corruption at municipality i was 
brought between 2007 and 2011 and 0 in the years prior to 2007.
(xi) Yeari: a variable indicating the year. We include it to control for potential time effects in the 
data pool. 
(xii) Regioni: a dummy variable for municipality i in each Regional Community in Spain. It controls 
for potential fixed effects.
(xiii) Againit: binary variable that takes the value 1 if the candidate stood for local elections again 
in the municipality i at year t, after having been imputed.
(xiv) AccusedProvincialit: takes the value 1 if municipality i is in a province where there has been a 
case of corruption at this level, at year t, and 0 in all other cases.
(xv) AccusedRegionalit:  takes the value 1 if municipality i is in a region where there has been a 
case of corruption at this level, at year t, and 0 in all other case. We include it to control for a 
regional effect on voters’ decisions.
The descriptive statistics are included in Table 4. We distinguish between non-corrupted and 
corrupted municipalities, defining a corrupted municipality as one in which at least one allegation 
of local corruption has been made. We note that the average population in corrupted 
municipalities is 56,724 habitants, whereas the average population in non-corrupted places is 
9,561.
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Although the population density is remarkably higher in corrupted municipalities, the 
unemployment rate differs by only 0.3 percentage points between corrupted and non-corrupted 
municipalities (5.8% and 5.3%, respectively).
Table 4. Descriptive statistics by municipality (1999, 2003, 2007)
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
C Non-C C Non-C C
Non-
C C Non-C
Population 56,724 9,561 223,701 39,139 968 159 3,132,463 1,595,110
Density of 
population 731 334 1,690 1232 6 1.6 17,257 21,844
Unemployment 
rate 5.8 5.3 2.5 2.6 0.7 0 19.3 23.2
Abstention 
share 30.5 25.2 9.9 9.3 4.5 0 54.4 71.1
Abstention, 
blank and no 
vote share
32.3 27.6 9.8 9.7 7 1.5 55.6 96.5
Share votes 
PP (*) 32.2 32.7 18.8 18.9 0.13 0.09 97 97
Share votes 
PSOE (*) 35.9 34.8 16.6 16.4 0.18 0.18 100 100
HHI 0.33 0.34 0.12 0.14 0 0 0.73 1
Maximum 
votes share 47.5 47.6 12.3 13.2 8.9 0.1 84.9 100
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: C: Corrupted municipality; Non-C: Non-corrupted municipality. (*) Includes data on 2011.
Focusing on the results of local elections, the abstention rate is 30.5% in corrupted municipalities 
and 25.2% in non-corrupted. Furthermore, when we consider blank and invalid votes, the rate of 
abstention increases 1.8 percentage points in corrupted municipalities and 2.4 in non-corrupted. 
Another a priori result shown in Table 3 is that the average vote share of the main right-wing party 
(PP) is lower in corrupted than in non-corrupted municipalities, while the vote share of PSOE is 
lower in non-corrupted municipalities.
Finally, measured by the average Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the concentration of vote shares of 
political parties in local elections also seems to be greater in non-corrupted municipalities. 
After having analysed the descriptive statistics of the variables and the cases of corruption by 
political party, period and geographical location, we estimate the effect of this local corruption in 
the following section.
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4. Empirical strategy
As we have explained, our purpose in this paper is twofold: First, we wish to evaluate the effects 
of local corruption on voters’ behaviour. Second, we intend to compute the changes in this 
behaviour across time and party.
At the time of the election, a voter has at least three options: to refrain from voting (abstention), to 
cast a blank or null vote, or to vote for a particular party. This last decision involves the additional 
choice of which party to vote for. We consider all of these questions in sections 4.2 and 4.3. Our 
primary goal is to determine whether there are structural factors that make a municipality more 
prone to corruption (section 4.1).
All estimations shown in the following sections use data from three local polls in the period 2003-
2011. We employ two empirical instruments: Ordinary Least Squares (hereafter OLS) estimations 
using clustering options, and matching analysis. We intend to evaluate the effect of an accusation 
of local corruption (treatment group) on referred endogenous variables compared with those 
municipalities not affected by corruption in any year (our control group).
4.1. Which is more prone to corruption?
The first question we examine is whether characteristics of a municipality or the composition of 
local government affect its likelihood to be corrupted.
Due to the reduced number of cases of corruption in relation to total municipalities, we have 
implemented a Complementary Log-Log estimation of the endogenous variable. The equation we 
have estimated is the following ([1]):
Corruptedi  0  1Population(lagged)it  2Unemployment(lagged)it 
4 HHIit  5Share  PPit  6Share  PSOEit  it
       [1]
We must note that all estimations have been clustered by province, to control for potential 
heterogeneous behaviour among different voters. The results are shown in Table 5.12
12 All estimations have also been made including fixed effects by region. The results do not change 
substantially.
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Table 5. Complementary log-log model to predict the occurrence of corruption
Explanatory 
variables
Endogenous variable
Accused 
in 2003
Accused 
in 2003
Accused 
in 2007
Accused 
in 2007
Accused 
in 2011
Accused 
in 2011
Population 
(lagged)
1.7e-6 (4e-
7)***
1.6e-6 (4e-
7)***
2.1e-6
(2.9e-7)***
2.3e-6
(5.3e-7)***
1e-6 (2e-
7)***
1e-6 (3e-
7)***
Unemployment 
rate (lagged)
0.2 
(0.04)*** .2 (0.06)***
0.1 
(0.05)**
0.1 
(0.05)**
0.07 
(0.02)**
0.05 
(0.02)*
HHI 
concentration 
votes index
-4.1 (1.8)** -3.1 (1.7)* -1.2 (0.7)*
Share-PP 1.5 (1.4) 0.9 (0.9) 1.1 (0.6)*
Share-PSOE -3.5 (1.9)* -2.7 (1.3)** 0.5 (0.5)
Constant -6.2 (0.7)***
-6.9 
(0.8)***
-4.2 
(0.5)***
-4.6 
(0.6)***
-3.4 
(0.5)***
-4.2 
(0.4)***
Observations 3253 3253 3253 3253 3315 3315
Non zero 
outcomes 7 7 42 42 168 168
Wald chi 41.37*** 18.51*** 57.89*** 28.15*** 17.27*** 33.45***
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Robust standard errors shown in brackets.
Table 5 includes six estimations that consider different endogenous variables (for cases in 2003, 
2007 and 2011) and different combinations of exogenous variables. Aside from 2011, all 
coefficients and significance remain constant.
The results show that municipalities with a case of local corruption have larger populations and 
higher unemployment rates in the year before elections. Two questions arise from this data.
The first question is the negative sign of the estimated coefficient of the local political votes 
concentration index. This implies that higher voter concentration leads to a reduced probability of 
corruption. Thus, coalition governments and other minority results are more prone to corruption 
than a mayor with an absolute majority.
The second is related to the role of the two main left-wing and right-wing parties in Spain. 
Interestingly, when using the share of these two parties by municipality, the variables have 
different signs; PP is positive in 2011, while PSOE is negative in 2003 and 2007, though the 
results are not significant.
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4.2. Corruption effects on abstention, blank and null votes
One of the major symptoms of general discomfort generated by corruption is the evasion of 
voting. This is harmful to democracies; encouraging citizens to vote is a main message in any 
electoral period. It is based on the idea that corruption has a negative impact on citizens’ trust and 
willingness to comply with rules.
We have used this idea to estimate equation number [2]. The endogenous variable is the portion 
of the population that decides not to vote (abstention) or to vote blank and null. We explain 
abstention using the historical results of this variable based on municipality (the lagged variable), 
the binary variables of local corruption, the characteristics of the municipality and fixed effects by 
region and year. We include all municipalities in the three years considered, including the cluster 
option by province.
%Abstention,blanksandnullsit  0  1%Abstention,blanksandnullsit1 
2Corruptionbefore2003it  3Corruptionperiod2003 07it 
4Corruptionperiod2007 11it  5Year  6Populationit1 
7Unemploymentit1  Regioni
i8
25
  it
[2]
Table 6 includes the results for the four models we have estimated. We present analyses for each 
year and the aggregated results. Models (1) to (3) estimate the effect of local corruption for each 
year, while the latter shows the aggregated effects since the time that local governments were 
accused.
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Table 6. Corruption effects on abstention, blanks and nulls votes
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
% Abstention+blank+null 
(lagged) 0.6 (0.02)*** 0.7 (0.05)*** 0.6 (0.04)*** 0.6 (0.03)***
Local corruption before 2003 0.005 (0.01) 0.024 (0.01)**
Local corruption before 2007 0.013 (0.006)**
0.018 
(0.005)***
Local corruption before 2011 0.014 (0.004)***
0.013 
(0.002)***
Year -8e-5 (1e-3)
Population (lagged) 1e-8 (1e-8) 7e-8 (4e-8)* 5e-8 (3e-8) 5e-8 (3e-8)
Unemployment rate (lagged) 0.001 (7e-4)* 0.001 (0.0008) 0.001 (6e-4)* 2e-4 (6e-4)
Fixed effects by Region YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.07 (0.007)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)*** 0.26 (3.02)
Observations 3241 3245 3304 9790
R2 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.58
F-statistic (*) (*) (*) (*)
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Robust standard errors shown in brackets.
Note 2: (*) Due to the used of both fixed effects by region and cluster by province, Stata does not report 
the F statistic for conjoint significance.
Except in 2003, when the number of local corruption cases was too small compared with the total 
population, local corruption increases the general evasion of votes by 1.35 percentage points (1.3 
in 2007 and 1.4 in 2011). If we consider the cumulative effect from the beginning of corruption 
(model 4), vote loss increases to an average of 1.8 percentage points.
Finally, a point to highlight is that this reduction in the percentage of valid polls increases over 
time. For instance, the cumulative percentage of loss reaches 2.4 percentage points in 2003, 
despite being the lower number of corruption cases. 
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4.3. Corruption effects on parties’ vote share
In addition to estimating the general effect of local corruption cases on electoral performance 
(which has been analysed by Costas et al, forthcoming), a main goal of this paper is to determine 
whether voters have different perceptions of corruption based on party.
Based on the nationalisation effect, the share concentration of votes in Spain and the 
concentration of local corruption cases (see Table 1), we focus solely on the two main political 
parties: the main right-wing (PP), and the main left-wing (PSOE). 
We therefore estimate a separate vote equation for each party. We consider local corruption 
cases of both parties while disregarding “clean” municipalities (i.e., cities where no corruption 
case exists) at all levels to minimise crossed or punish votes to the opposite party. We expect that 
the most dramatic effects occurred in local elections close to the date of imputation,13 although we 
will also study cumulative effects.
The voter’s equation is similar for both parties (see equations [3] and [4]). We attempt to explain 
the share of PSOE (equation [3]) and PP (equation [4]) based on the historical voting behaviour in 
the municipality (the lagged variable), the binary variables of corruption cases at the local, 
provincial and regional levels, characteristics of the municipality, fixed effects by region and year, 
and the binary variable to control the decision of accused to stand for election.
Share  PSOEit  0  1Share  PSOEit1  2Corruptionbefore2003it 
3Corruptionperiod2003 07it  4Corruptionperiod2007 11it  5Again 
6AccusedRegional  7AccusedProvincial  8Populationit1 
9Unemploymentit1  10Year  Regioni 
i11
28
 it
[3]
Table 7 includes the results for three specifications of equation [3].
13 In a study of state-level corruption audits in Brazil, Pereira, Melo and Figuereido (2009) found that 
corruption allegations made immediately prior to an election reduce a mayor´s probability of re-election, but 
allegations made public at a time prior to elections have no significant effect.
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Table 7. Effects of corruption on PSOE (left-wing party) vote share
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Share PSOE in previous 
elections 0.75 (0.02)*** 0.74 (0.02)*** 0.66 (0.01)***
Local corruption before 2003 -0.034 (0.017)* -0.034 (0.017)* -0.045 (0.01)***
Local corruption before 2007 -0.028 (0.012)** -0.029 (0.012)** -0.026 (0.01)**
Local corruption before 2011 0.001 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004)
Stand for again 0.008 (0.023) 0.008 (0.023) 0.003 (0.02)
Imputation at Regional level 0.02 (0.007)** -0.008 (0.005)
Imputation at Provincial level -0.006 (0.01) -0.003 (0.007)
Unemployment rate (lagged) -0.0005(0.0005)
Population (lagged) -1e-8 (1e-8)
Region effect NO NO YES
Year effect YES YES YES
Constant 0.049 (0.01)*** 0.044 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.008)***
Observations 8825 8825 8825
R2 0.64 0.65 0.67
F-statistic 299.18*** 258.81*** (*)
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors shown in brackets.
Note 2: (*) Due to the used of both fixed effects by region and cluster by province, Stata does 
not report the F statistic for conjoint significance.
Overall, the results of the estimations lead to the following summary: those accused of local 
corruption produce a negative cumulative effect on PSOE’s vote share of between 4.5 and 2.6 
percentage points, depending upon the year and model considered. These data represent the 
years 2003 and 2007, but the coefficient for 2011 is not significant in any estimation.
These variables are significant in all cases except corruption at higher levels of government. 
Therefore, it appears that the vote share of PSOE is not influenced by actions at higher levels of 
government, but only local corruption is considered and punished. Considering that the mean 
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share vote data of PSOE is 35.9, an average reduction of 3.6 percentage points is close to 10% 
vote loss.
Finally, it appears that a “personal effect” on the vote does not exist. The variable “Stand for 
again” is not statistically significant, which implies that voters punish the party regardless of 
whether the corrupt official was removed from office.
Finally, we analyse the effects of local corruption on PP voters. Equation [4] is similar in structure 
to equation [3] but we have substituted the main right wing polling data.
Share  PPit  0  1Share  PPit1  2Corruptionbefore2003it 
3Corruptionperiod2003 07it  4Corruptionperiod2007 11it  5Again 
6AccusedRegional  7AccusedProvincial  8Populationit1 
9Unemploymentit1  10Year  Regioni 
i11
28
 it
[4]
Table 8 includes estimated coefficients.14
14 We also test the results of Tables 7 and 8 with a SURE estimation (abstention and vote equations 
simultaneously) and by considering only votes to given parties (i.e. not considering nulls, blanks and 
abstention). This analysis introduced no significant changes.
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Table 8. Effects of corruption on PP (Right-hand party) vote share
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Share-PP in previous 
elections 0.860 (0.02)*** 0.86 (0.022)*** 0.71 (0.01)***
Local corruption before 
2003 0.016 (0.04) 0.017 (0.04) 0.039 (0.035)
Local corruption before 
2007 0.039 (0.016)** 0.039 (0.016)** 0.026 (0.01)*
Local corruption before 
2011 0.015 (0.007)* 0.014 (0.007)* 0.007 (0.005)
Stand for again -0.045 (0.016)** -0.046 (0.016)*** -0.041 (0.014)**
Imputation at Regional level 0.001 (0.01) -0.02 (0.014)
Imputation at Provincial 
level 0.03 (0.007)*** 0.024 (0.009)**
Unemployment rate 
(lagged) -0.0005 (0.0004)
Population (lagged) 2e-8 (1e-8)**
Region effect NO NO YES
Year effect YES YES YES
Constant 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.09 (0.01)***
Observations 7622 7622 7622
R2 0.76 0.77 0.79
F-statistic 328.61*** 269.26*** (*)
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors shown in brackets.
Note 2: (*) Due to the used of both fixed effects by region and cluster by province, Stata does 
not report the F statistic for conjoint significance.
The most important fact to note in this table is that the signs of the coefficients of local corruption 
binary variables are positive. In general, the models points to an increase of vote share between 
1.4 and 3.9 points, depending on the year and model considered. The data from 2003 are not 
statistically significant.
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Moreover, if we take into account municipalities located in provinces in which a PP corruption 
case occurred, the positive impact on local vote share is higher (see coefficients of variables 
“Imputation at Provincial levels”).
Additionally, the variable “Stand for again” is statistically significant in all models and has a 
negative sign. This means that PP voters punish local corruption if the leader is not expelled from 
the party (or at least not considered for upcoming elections).
This outcome suggests that alleged local corruption cases are perceived differently by the two 
main groups of electorate. While left-wing voters punish corruption by approximately 10%, right-
wing voters actually increase their vote share. The vote share only decreases when a case of 
local corruption occurs in a province with no other cases of corruption and if the leader does not 
run for re-election.
However, these estimations may be limited by two potential biases, as explained in Heckman et al 
(1997). The first occurs when the corruption affects a city for which there is no comparable 
unaffected city for comparison (and vice versa). The second is derived from different distributions 
of the vector of observable variables that affects our endogenous variable within the two groups of 
municipalities. To adjust for these biases, we implement a matching estimator.
Before implementing the matching estimator, we analyse the propensity score, or the individual 
probability of receiving the treatment given the observed covariates. We must ensure that the 
balancing properties of the propensity score are satisfied, meaning that observations with the 
same score values have the same distributions of observable characteristics, irrespective of 
treatment status. 
Therefore, we consider the age of imputation of local corruption produced by each party as a 
treatment variable, depending on previous votes for the left- or right-wing party, the age of 
provincial or regional corruption of the party, and other variables such us the lagged 
unemployment rate, the lagged structure of the population and the HHI concentration of the votes 
index. 
Once we have determined the propensity score, we estimate the Average Treatment on the 
Treated (ATT) through the Kernel matching estimator. We analyse the average effect on the votes 
obtained by PP or PSOE, in the local elections of 2003, 2007 and 2011. We use the variables 
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mentioned above but also add the variable again, which considers whether the candidate stood 
for local elections after having been imputed. The results are presented in Table 9.
Table 9. Summary of results of Matching estimator
Party Average Treatment on Treated (ATT)
PP 0.040 (0.017)***
PSOE -0.020 (0.011)***
Note: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard deviation among brackets
These calculations support the results obtained in previous sections. Overall, the right-wing party 
PP increased its average vote share by approximately 4.0% in the elections of 2003, 2007 and 
2011, despite having been involved in local corruption cases. Conversely, the left-wing party 
PSOE has been punished in the polls, as their votes decreased by approximately 2.0%, on 
average.
According to Winter and Weitz-Shapiro (2010), there are two main possible explanations as to 
why voters support corrupt politicians (as in the case of PP, or the modest effect of PSOE): the 
information hypothesis and the tradeoff hypothesis. The former suggests that voters support 
corrupt politicians when they lack information about a candidate’s involvement in corruption upon 
which they could then act in the voting booth. However, as we have explained in the previous 
sections, all cases we considered have been publicised and formally accused, so this hypothesis 
does not fit.
The latter is understood by voters in the following way: they expect that benefits from a politician’s 
actions in government will be greater than costs associated with corruption.15 However, neither 
PP’s nor PSOE’s local corruption is different from the other (see Table 3), nor are there 
differences in the structural characteristics or singular behaviour between municipalities.
A third possible explanation is the “loyalty hypothesis”. It is common knowledge that Spanish 
right-wing voters are more loyal and faithful than left-wing voters. Moreover, the main right-wing 
party in Spain has objected in recent years to judgment pressure around local corruption in 
municipalities governed by PP. However, the data presented in Table 1 describe a similar 
development for both PP and PSOE. PP’s voters may therefore use this fact as an argument for 
15 These authors summarise this hypothesis in a more comprehensive Brazilian sentence: “rouba, mas faz” 
(he robs, but he gets things done).
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party loyalty. Thus, rejecting the two previous hypotheses, the loyalty hypothesis may explain this 
phenomenon.
5. Conclusions
During the first decade of the XXIth century, the Spanish economic boom was equally matched by 
a boom in political corruption, mainly at local and regional level. In fact, the cases of (presumed) 
corruption increased from 7 in the 1999-2003 period to 180 in the last legislative period (2007-
2011). For this reason, corruption is currently widely perceived as an important social problem in 
Spain.
Several empirical papers have already studied the economic and social effects of corruption, but 
most of them have focused on macroeconomic indicators and cross-country level analyses. More 
recently, a newer branch of the empirical literature has emerged to study the effects of corruption 
cases on voters’ behaviour. These studies usually find modest effects on voters’ attitudes in most 
countries, with the exception of Brazil (Ferraz and Finan, 2008) as the only documented case 
where corruption may significantly alter elections results at a widespread level.
To study this issue with Spanish data, we have built our own dataset of municipalities that 
includes detailed information on economic indicators, polling results and corruption cases. The 
latter include not only local cases, but also provincial and regional corruption cases.
We try to test whether wrongdoing by local politicians in the previous legislative period affects 
voters´ decisions, during the elections that took place between 1999 and 2011. Our analysis does 
not only investigate the general effects (participation rates, null votes), but also whether there are 
different perceptions of corruption by voters depending on which party is (presumably) 
responsible for it, that is, right-wing vs. left-wing parties, respectively represented by the Partido 
Popular (PP) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE. 
We estimate a voting-share equation by difference-in-difference techniques and apply a matching 
estimator to test our voters’ behavioural hypotheses. Our results can be fitted into three general 
categories. The first one relates to the factors that convert a municipality more prone to 
corruption. Estimates show that the higher the unemployment rate and the lower the partisan 
concentration, the larger the probability that a case of (presumed) corruption appears in a 
municipality.
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The second category is the effect of corruption on voters’ turnover. In this case, local corruption 
shows a cumulative effect of vote-loss increase to an average of 1.8 percentage points, since 
2003. Abstention increases around 1.5 percentage points due to (presumed) local corruption 
cases.
Finally, we disaggregated voters’ attitude towards (presumed) corruption, and found that it 
substantially differs between right-wing and left-wing parties. In this regard, both difference-in-
difference and matching analysis reaches to same conclusion: local corruption reduces the vote-
share of PSOE about 2 percentage points, while PP’s share does not only goes unpunished but 
increases (around 3 percentage points). These estimates seem to confirm that right-wing voters 
are more loyal to their parties than left-wing ones. 
Thus, taking into account the overall weak effects of corruption on political parties’ performances, 
it can be sadly concluded that it has paid to be a crook (at least in Spain) until now. Things should 
change in the future.
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